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MISSION POSSIBLE: MAKING UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS MORE EFFECTIVE

by

Brenda Connors

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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OPPORTUNITIES TO ACHIEVE OPERATIONAL ART IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS ARE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL, RANGING FROM CURRENTLY EVOLVING U.S. POLICY DIRECTIVES TO POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS STRUCTURE, STAFFING, INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES, COMMUNICATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL. SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THESE ISSUES BUT MUCH MORE MUST BE DONE. WISELY, THE U.S. IS MOVING TOWARD COMMITING ITS OWN TROOPS AND SUPPORT ONLY WHEN IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET. THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT, THE U.S., AFTER SETTING ITS OWN POLICIES, SHOULD ENGAGE OTHER NATIONS IN A DISCUSSION OF THE GOALS - AND LIMITS - OF PEACE OPERATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE U.S. COULD BEGIN TO LEAD AN EFFORT THAT IT IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO DO: HELP THE U.N. UPGRADE ITS PEACE OPERATIONS APPARATUS TO A FAR HIGHER LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AND PROFESSIONALISM.

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Abstract of
MISSION POSSIBLE: MAKING UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS MORE EFFECTIVE

Opportunities to achieve operational art in United Nations peace operations are discussed in detail, ranging from currently evolving U.S. policy directives to possible improvements in U.N. peace operations structure, staffing, intelligence capabilities, communication and command and control. Some progress has been made on these issues but much more must be done. Wisely, the U.S. is moving toward committing its own troops and support only when important operational and political criteria have been met. This paper argues that, the U.S., after setting its own policies, should engage other nations in a discussion of the goals - and limits - of peace operations. At the same time, the U.S. could begin to lead an effort that it is uniquely qualified to do: help the U.N. upgrade its peace operations apparatus to a far higher level of proficiency and professionalism.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Without question, the United Nations (U.N.) peace operations apparatus is in dire need of review and improvement. For evidence, one need only look at last year's stumbles in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. But what should be done? Given that the U.S. is recognized as the world's dominant and most modern military power, there are myriad operational lessons that the Pentagon can share with the U.N. that would make peace operations more effective, more efficient and safer.

Although there is great debate about the efficacy and future of the U.N. Military Staff Committee, the United States (U.S.) through this committee has been providing significant guidance to the U.N. on the formalization of an evolving military structure in support of the operational level of peace operations. This paper will highlight how the U.S. will be able to share tenets of American military doctrine and principles of Joint Warfare that will be critical to the evolution of modern peace operations in the multilateral context. The U.S. has had the distinct advantage of developing over several years' time its own Joint Doctrine. Thus, the United Nations could benefit from the U.S. experience in such areas as Unity of Command and Effort, Sustainment, Intelligence and Security. Certain basics of operational art, have been a part of classic U.N. operations (and currently need refinement); but many have not, and their incorporation will

become imperative if the U.N. is to move further along the peace operations continuum from political to more-military actions.

U.S. military and political experts closest to the action in New York say operational art may be fully achieved at the U.N. only after U.S. political and strategic level commitments are made.[1] This research effort began with the goal of arriving at fresh recommendations on how to strengthen the operational role of the U.N. in peace operations. While some recommendations will be set forth in this paper, and hopefully serve to further the ongoing dialogue, what must precede the evolution of operational art in U.N. peace operations is a current and relevant strategic commitment on the part of the U.S.

The United Nations Will Need Operational Art

As the primary architect of the United Nations in the 1940s, the U.S. would be remiss today not to recognize the urgency of taking a leading role in the current evolution of the organization's peace operations process. By allowing a near-vacuum of political-military guidance to exist at the United Nations, the U.S. not only undermines the efficacy of an organization many feel is the best hope for peace and security in the Twenty-First Century, but we fail to fully serve U.S. national interests as well.

The United Nations is certainly not without its limitations. Still, the U.N. represents mankind's broadest attempt to coordinate peace operations, and whatever its flaws, the U.N.'s

potential should not be dismissed lightly. Moreover, a commitment to effective U.N. reform does not preclude the United States from acting unilaterally in our own interests when circumstances warrant.

What becomes clear upon a review of recent peace operations is that the post-Cold War climate will demand from the U.N. more military operational capacity than the framers of the organization could have envisioned nearly a half century ago. In short, the U.N. needs to evolve to meet the needs of today's world, particularly in the arena of peace operations.

The changing climate was well described by General Colin L. Powell, who said:

> "World governments will need to deal increasingly with demands of peacekeeping and peacemaking. The bi-polar grip on the world caused by superpower stand off has been broken. Tensions, ethnic hatred, historic antagonism that had been repressed for half a century are now bursting upon the world and spawning new conflicts."[2]

To help reform the U.N. peace operations structure and its operational shortcomings, the United States must first conclude its own internal debate on the matter, publicly define our viewpoint, and then set about advancing that position through the application of money, expertise and, where appropriate, military might. Once Washington has reached consensus its own approach, the U.S. can support the development of U.N. military operations by providing assistance in specialized areas such as logistics, training, intelligence, communications, command and control and public affairs.

Though winning all U.N. members over to the U.S. viewpoint will not be easy, there is at least some recognition within the U.N. of the need for improvements in the peace operations apparatus. And that is important. U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, in his 1992 report entitled, An Agenda For Peace, put it this way:

> "As the international climate has changed and peace-keeping operations are increasingly fielded ... a new array of demands and problems has emerged ... all of which could be corrected if member states so asked were ready to make necessary resources available."[3]

But certainly the problem is broader than a simple lack of resources, and U.S. officials must make this plain. The most vexing problems with peace operations lie not in the field with the United Nations Commanders but at U.N. Headquarters itself, where there is a serious lack of unity of command and effort, not to mention a lack of unified will on the part of the member states in favor of implementing peace operations once such operations are promulgated by the Security Council or the General Assembly. As history has repeatedly shown, wars cannot be won without a powerful will to fight.

In many ways the U.N. peace apparatus has been inimical to sound military operations. Among the flaws in U.N. peace operations are bureaucratic waffling on directives, shortages of funding, an inadequate military operations structure, a dearth of effective intelligence capabilities, a lack of senior and mid-level military officers and a host of strained civilian-military relationships.[4]

How can the United States help? As mentioned, first and foremost, the U.S. needs to decide its position on peace operations in general, a process now being carried forward through a policy paper known as Presidential Decision Directive # 13 (PDD 13.) Once that is accomplished, the U.S. can be an enormous resource to the U.N., supplying expertise in operational art and the principles of war as appropriate. Foremost among the principles security: the protection of U.S. and other member states' military officers working in support of operations. The application of U.S. doctrine on security will serve to enlarge the body of peace enforcement principles and save more peace-keepers' lives. The application of U.S. military doctrine may compel the U.N. on certain issues to transcend the formerly sacrosanct tenet of impartiality towards all members. This shift may see the U.N. undertake peace operations under Chapter Seven of its Charter, which allows the U.N. to respond to acts of aggression.

On a loftier level, President Clinton should invite fellow chiefs of state to join him in a discussion of the appropriate role for U.N. peacekeeping in the world today. This should lead member states to a greatly improved awareness of global realities - political, military and financial. Such discussions would make clear the role the U.S. will be playing in U.N. peace operations and help member states decide what role they will play. This may be one of the most important initiatives the U.S. can undertake in regard to future U.N. peace operations. To begin this process

now, with the goal of achieving near-consensus in time for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations on October 24, 1995, should become a foreign policy priority for the U.S. Government and the Clinton Administration. Such U.S. leadership is desperately needed to help transform the U.N.'s seriously flawed peace operations apparatus into a worthy partner for U.S. military forces.

By seizing the initiative outlined above, the U.S. can assist the United Nations in developing the first global approach to operational art.

CHAPTER II

THE U.S SEIZES THE INITIATIVE -- GRADUALLY

PDD 13: A Reflection of U.S. Military Doctrine and More

The Clinton Administration's main body of thinking on U.N. peace operations is contained in Presidential Decision Directive #13 (PDD 13) previously known as the Presidential Review Determination, a classified policy document that apparently reached U.S. interagency agreement during the week of January 17, 1994.[1] Among other things, PDD 13 sets parameters for U.S. involvement in peace operations, establishing tough new boundaries for the use of American military force.[2] The document was expected to go to Capitol Hill in late January, and optimists hope it will be ready for Presidential signature in February.[3]

The need to circumscribe U.N. peacekeeping efforts in some way was alluded to last year by President Clinton in his first address to the U.N. General Assembly:

> "The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no. The United Nations must also have a technical means to run a modern, world class peacekeeping operation."[4]

Clearly, this statement signaled a more pragmatic view of U.N. capacities. Fortunately, such sentiments are carried forward in PDD 13, the product of the Departments of Defense, State, and the National Security Council. The document not only sets limitations on the use of force in peace operations, it also

represents a political, military and resource commitment that is well-defined and therefore welcome. Among PDD 13's major recommendations is a plan to bolster the professionalism and the size of the peace operations staff at U.N. Headquarters. Today, there are less than one-hundred fulltime employees devoted to overseeing peace operations. This staff is tiny considering it was responsible in 1993 for 75,000 troops in 18 separate missions throughout the globe.[5] That is not to say that the U.N. as a whole is understaffed: Its Department of Public Information alone has 800 employees.[6] Clearly, the U.N. must set its budget priorities better, and the U.S., as member state, must continue to make its voice heard on such finance issues.

Due to events in Somalia PDD 13 was delayed beyond its planned completion date of August 1993 and debate was reopened for five additional months on the appropriate level of U.S. involvement in peace operations efforts. In fact, last August Congress ambushed PDD 13 and began a flurry of new legislation aimed at constraining use of U.S. military force and money for peace operations. The culmination of this Congressional reaction was the January 25th, 1994, introduction of the proposed Peace Powers Act by Senate minority leader Robert Dole. To some degree, this bill pits Congress against the President on various aspects of war powers.

However, as will become evident from an examination of PDD 13 (derived from unclassified sources)[7] many of the concerns raised in the proposed Peace Powers Act have been addressed by

the Executive Branch with substantial input from the Pentagon. It also appears that the final Clinton Policy on U.N. peace operations is decidedly more narrow than the version that circulated last August. For instance, the proposal to create a rapid deployment force has been dropped.[8] But PDD 13 by no means represents a retreat in the face of setbacks in Somalia and Haiti. As one U.S. source close to the drafting process revealed, "There is a hope to return to the prospect of forceful use of U.N. assets to enforce peace settlements."[9]

If blessed by Congress, PDD 13 will be the most far-reaching yet precise policy on U.N. peace operations. It will include new definitions of what the U.S. considers a threat to international peace and security. It will also contain provisions for the President to decide when and under what conditions U.S. forces will be placed under operational control of a U.N. commander.[10]

The document's tenets of operational control include parameters that will serve the interests of the U.S. military and preserve its doctrine. Right now, Joint Publication 3.0 and FM 10023 and Joint Pub 3-07.39 (draft) are the Department of Defense's chief doctrines related to peace operations. Further regulations are now being developed at USACOM, Norfolk, Virginia to dovetail with PDD 13.[11]

One of the most important provisions of PDD 13 speaks directly to a crucial aspect of operational art. The U.S. will no longer commit troops or other support without a well-defined U.N. strategy and a clear termination plan. PDD 13 also requires that

any peace operation mission be shown to involve U.S. interests before it gets commitment of U.S. troops and resources. The new policy aims to insure that once political peace operation resolutions are established, they will be linked to attainable military goals. PDD 13's framers voice determination to avoid getting embroiled in such intractable standoffs as in the one between India and Pakistan, where the U.N. has been carrying on peace operations in varying degrees since 1948.[12]

Under PDD 13 among the new conditions that must be present before U.S. policy-makers commit to U.N. peace operations are: a threat to international security has arisen, a gross violation of human rights needs to be addressed, or a major disaster demands immediate attention and relief.

It is unlikely that PDD 13 will include a precise list of situations in which U.S. force and financial commitment would be warranted. Madeline Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. has publicly stated that too much precision in regard to the use of force can inhibit flexibility and can send contrary messages abroad and at home. [13] Yet a State Department official involved in drafting PDD 13 suggested that U.S. military commitments in the future are likely to emerge in one of the following forms:

1. Unilateral deployment of U.S. forces
2. In concert with ad hoc coalitions, as was the case in Kuwait
3. Through a regional organization such as NATO
4. As a participant to U.N. operations, either under U.S. Command as in Korea, or, in limited cases under U.N. Command, as in Macedonia [14]

Joint Pub. 3.0 stipulates that Command and Control requires unity of effort from the outset. Honoring this tenet, PDD 13 proposes strict preconditions as the criteria for placement of American forces under U.N. command. U.S. forces would be ordered to serve under foreign commanders only if it were necessary from a military standpoint to ensure effectiveness of an operation. Such orders would be issued by the President himself on a case by case basis. One U.S. official close to the drafting process elaborated, saying that if a "dangerous operation is imminent, it will be less likely to be undertaken under the command of U.N. forces." [15] Another U.S. official added, " The larger and more complex the operation, the less likely that U.S. troops will be placed under U.N. command." [16]

This criteria clearly reflects Joint Pub 6-0's, Doctrine for Command, Control and Communications Systems Support to Joint Operations, which stresses the importance of an efficient joint-force command structure. Command, control and communications systems should be reliable, survivable, flexible, interoperable, timely and secure. These features are not consistently characteristic of U.N. peace operations. Cognizant of U.N. shortcomings, the U.S. argues that on hazardous missions, Washington will want a U.S. official to be in command or near the top of the command, in the number two position, for instance.[17]

Early drafts of PDD 13 contained a controversial section requiring commanders under U.N. operational control "to maintain separate reporting channels to higher U.S. military authorities

and disobey U.N. orders which they judge to be illegal, outside the agreed mandate or militarily imprudent or unsound."[18] This section has been edited significantly and possibly dropped, according to one American official. [19]

Also controversial was a passage contained in the August version of PDD 13 reserving the U.S. right "to terminate the participation of the U.S. unit and take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect them, if they are endangered."[20] This passage was reportedly "an attempt to stop reckless tactical maneuvers," and was probably deleted.[21]

The new approach seems to be to try to avoid such conflicts by keeping U.S. troops in most cases under U.S. command. Given the strong feelings on the part of the American electorate and the real concerns on the part of the U.S. military, this seems to be the most workable solution.

The new approach also better conforms with standard U.S. military doctrine. For commanders, the authority is found in the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act, quoted in Joint Pub. 1 which clearly states, "Combatant commanders have the full range of authority needed to meet their responsibilities." [22] As revised, PDD 13 appears to preserve that authority and avoid conflicts within U.N. peace operations.

A recent discussion with a U.S. official reveals that much of the policy formulation on PDD 13 since August 1993 involved assuring Congress and Department of Defense officials that the document fully honors the principles of war and U.S. military

doctrine as they relate to U.S. command and control, rules of engagement and the laws of conflict.[23]

The parameters envisioned under PDD 13 leave ample room for actions falling under the U.N. Charter's Chapter VI, Pacific Settlements of Disputes, Chapter VII, Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression, and Chapter VIII, Regional Arrangements. Indeed, the new policy will apparently place considerable emphasis on the roles of regional organizations.

Reports about PDD 13 in the summer of 1993 suggested that special attention had been given to the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and one indicated that under PDD 13 operations in the Former Soviet Union, must meet the following criteria:

1. Operations must be of a finite duration and remain under strict political control by U.N. officials in New York
2. Operations must be welcomed by all parties to the dispute
3. Operations must adopt a neutral stance and respect all borders
4. Operations must preserve democratic policies[24]

Although the FSU policy clearly reflects the use of the U.N. Charter's Chapter VIII, we see creative use of American power in a strict political-military policy formulation, reflecting U.S. national interests and demanding a higher operational art.

This new policy on the FSU brings to the forefront the question of how far the U.S. can exercise such unilateral intent and power, while still honoring the principles of sovereignty and

remaining an effective partner in the U.N. context. This issue is the source of much debate. But what seems clear in 1994, is that the U.S. appears committed to full participation in the multilateral arena, and on its own terms. Critical to that effort will be insuring that U.N. peace operations have appropriate political and operational support before any U.S. troops or resources are committed.

CHAPTER III

SHAPING OPERATIONAL ART: HOW TO BUILD A U.N. MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE -- FROM NOTHING

As put forth in the publication Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, agility, a universal application of operational art is about timeliness: thinking, planning, and communicating.[1] Unfortunately, agility is not at this time a characteristic of the U.N. peace operations apparatus.

The state of peace operations infrastructure at U.N. Headquarters, as recently as early 1993, was horrifying, especially considering how it put the lives of soldiers at risk. One example: Despite having more than a dozen ongoing peace operations, the United Nations did not have arrangements to receive telephone calls from overseas commanders in trouble after regular business hours.[2]

Even as the U.S. has been formulating its own policy toward peace operations, however, a slow but steady movement towards rectifying these unacceptable conditions has begun.[3] What has evolved over the past year is humble in relation to the growth of the U.N. peace operations mandate, but it is nonetheless, a vast improvement. In spite of many constraints, this U.N. effort at peace operations reform is progressing with the watchful guidance of the U.S. The guidance is carried out daily by the U.S. Mission

to the United Nations in New York, which frequently has a first-hand perspective on developments, and helps form Washington's perceptions. It is known that PDD 13 calls for concrete steps to improve the infrastructure of U.S. peace operations and the military headquarters staff, specifically by supplying new staff members and resources. PDD 13 suggests a doubling of the current headquarters to about two-hundred, including twenty Americans from the Departments of Defense and State. Additionally PDD 13 calls for:

1. A research division (military intelligence), signalling a concern for the principle of security
2. An operations division with 24 hour staffing and encrypted command, control and communications, reflecting the principle of unity of command and effort
3. A rapidly deployable headquarters team (to assist new operations in the field get underway, insuring forward presence
4. A standing airlift capability via commercial and possibly leased Russian military transports[4]

Command,Control and Intelligence

For more than a year U.S. efforts have been quietly under way that would provide the U.N. with guidance for the development of command, control and intelligence support. Approximately ten months ago a Situation Room, subsequently renamed the Situation Center, was established at U.N. Headquarters in New York. This 24 hour operation, although bare bones, has grown over the past year in both its resources and the capacity of its staff.[5]

The United States Representative to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, United States Air Force Colonel Thomas Kearney is pleased with these developments. He supports the U.N.'s strategy in regard to the Situation Center, and particularly its evolving intelligence capacity.

Traditionally, the U.N. has not had or desired an "intelligence" capacity, feeling it was antithetical to its philosophy and to the mission of the organization. At worst, critics of intelligence have argued such activity smacks of spying on member states. However, today the U.N. is gradually realizing that intelligence will be increasingly important to effect achievement of the organization's goals, both in peace operations and in Chapter VII enforcement actions, which may be increasingly common.[6] Colonel Kearney reports the U.N. intelligence capacity and those running it are taking it slow, assessing its real and potential impact and allowing U.N. officials to become aware of its usefulness.[7] Basically, the growth of intelligence at the U.N. will be commensurate with the perception that it is highly valuable. At least three individuals of the twenty-plus staff are on duty at all times, 24 hours a day, in the Center. There are 10 telephones, four faxes with encrypted capacity and a Joint Defense Intelligence Support System (JDISS) donated by the U.S.

The United Nations with the help of the JDISS has now also the capacity to transmit to its commands in the field the information it receives on its New York terminal from the U.S.

National Military Command Center (NMCC), and the National Military Joint Information Command (NMJIC) in Washington. For instance, there is a JDISS in the United Nations Command in Somalia (UNOSOM II), and the Mogadishu peace operation has the ability to receive JDISS information in five other Somali cities.[8]

Unfortunately the U.N. to date has not developed a formal classification system, it merely has Level I, Unclassified, and Level II, Sensitive. For example, intelligence that fits the U.N. Level I category, documents of a less sensitive nature, can be routinely transmitted to the Situation Center through JDISS. Information of the more sensitive Level II, is hand-carried by a U.S. military intelligence officer from the U.S. Mission in New York across the street to U.N. Headquarters where the information will be shared with designated U.N. officials and then retained by American officers. This unprecedented sharing with a non-governmental organization, unlike NATO, presents new and different operational issues for the U.S. in regard to the potential compromise of American sources and information. Even more unrefined is the capacity of the U.N. officials in receipt of this information who need to interpret and apply it.[9]

Moreover, intelligence is also being received by the U.N. Situation Center on a regular basis from at least four other nations: the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Morocco, and Nigeria. As recently as late January 1994, President Clinton's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, with a mission to determine where

the U.S. wishes to go in providing U.S. intelligence to the U.N. visited the Situation Center to observe the scene. They, like everyone who visits the place, were said to be struck by its humble appearance and capacity.[10]

Intelligence is fundamental to the operational element of security. This innovation in the Situation Center of receiving U.S. and other nations processed intelligence certainly signals a radical new direction for the U.N., and a recognition of the imperative nature of integrating intelligence into the operational level of planning peace operations.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

In addition to upgrading its intelligence capacity, the U.N., with the assistance of the U.S., has begun improving the recently created Department of Peacekeeping. Until February 1992, when the Secretary General restructured the organization, U.N. peace operations fell under the Office of Special Political Affairs. Today the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations is led by Ghanian diplomat Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping. The Department of Peacekeeping consists of the Office of the Under-Secretary and his staff, the aforementioned Situation Center, a Political Office and a Military Advisor. Today the Department's Military Advisor is a Canadian Major General, Maurice Baril, who of late has as his senior aide a U.S. Army Special Forces Lt. Colonel. Within the Office of Peacekeeping exists a Field Operations Department, consisting of a Logistics Command Section, a Field Personnel

Section, and a Field Finance Budget Section. This recently consolidated arrangement implies a more adequate unity of command and effort. Apparently, there is a U.N. proposal to move the Field Finance Section and the Field Personnel Section out of the Peacekeeping Department's Field Operations Unit and back to the larger U.N. offices of Budget and Finance.[11] The United States is lobbying to prevent this rearrangement arguing that the current organization will work better and perhaps be less politicized, a factor that can become significant on an operational level.[12]

Although for months there has been talk of a formal Department of Peacekeeping Operations Planning Document that would include provisions for a Operations Planning Cell, to date none exists.[13] Operationally, this represents one of the most serious structural omissions in the organization. A host of thoughtful proposals exist for linking the political-strategic goals of peace operations to the tactical through a variety of operational level mechanisms, some utilizing the Military Staff Committee, others proposing altogether new arrangements. It is fair to say once PDD 13 is announced, operational structures within the U.N. will become more a focus of the process. An essential planning document and planning cell is then likely to surface.

Despite frequent differences of opinion between the U.S. and the U.N., it seems that the U.N. will be open to the needed structural changes in its peace operations apparatus, but not

before the U.S. makes its position known. Other nations, too, are expected in most cases to go along with U.S. recommendations.

Peace Operations Sustainment

Since the end of the Cold War some theorists have argued that nations which are unable to take effective action to stop various horrific eruptions of warfare have soothed their national consciences, appeased domestic constituencies and avoided military commitments by looking to the U.N. to solve their problems, however intractable. Yet these nations have not provided the commitment to the U.N., either financial or political, to help it meet its peace operation goals.

Although PDD 13 provided some solid support for upgrading the peace operations structure, the U.S. still faces the considerable task of explaining PDD 13, gaining suppport for its basic concepts and lobbying for appropriate funding, both in America and abroad. As one American military official says, "Its a nice package, but it is far from tightly wrapped."[14]

Management of United Nations peace operations certainly needs improvement. One U.S. military officer currently serving in the U.N. peace operations apparatus feels that better direction and leadership of the operation is imperative.[15]
The challenge of managing a large group of military officers who hail from a dozen different countries, all with different training, is daunting yet this military officer believes the intent and desire on the part of the U.N.'s Field Operations

Department is strong.[16] What is needed is a clear chain of command in the U.N. from civilian to the military, and of course, appropriate authority and resources. Right now, the command chain suffers from bureaucratic layering that is unfortunately characteristic of the U.N. in general. It seems much money is wasted. In one case the chance to get a donation of helicopters was lost due to red tape.[17]

In regard to improving the operational art at the U.N. it seems plausible that once strategic and political commitments are made, operational aspects of peace operations will have a chance to root, despite the challenges of working in a multinational context.

Still the difficulties of trying to impose American leadership onto the world's largest multinational organization are underscored by the recent dismissal by Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali of his Under Secretary of Management, a Clinton Administration appointment, foreign service officer and most recently U.S. ambassador to Zaire. Additionally, constructing a new operational level of civilian military structure will be made exceedingly difficult in a climate of tight budgets.

PDD 13 does call for a new shared budgetary process within the U.S. government in regard to peace operations.[18] The directive's framers arrived at a formula whereby the Department of State would take the lead and foot the bill if the U.S. became a partner to a "classic peacekeeping" operation where troops

monitor an agreement with the consent of all parties on the ground.[19] In cases where U.S. forces are authorized to enforce peace through use of unilateral military power, the Department of Defense will be financially and politically responsible.[20] This is a significant development in support of a rational operational plan for sustainment of U.N. peace operations. The U.S. pays, but an age-old bureaucratic conflict seems to have been resolved.

Progress will be more difficult on proposals to reduce the U.S. assessment by allowing credit for the enormous amounts of U.S. resources that have been donated over the years in the forms of equipment, transport, logistics and personnel. An American official recently tasked with compiling what and how much the U.S. had donated toward peace operations over the years commented that, due to the fragmented and ad hoc manner in which resources had been donated, no accurate account can be assembled.[21]

Meanwhile, the conflict between Congress and the Executive Branch over the evolution of peace operations' budgeting promises to be significant. Senator Robert Dole's staff is calling for more accurate initial peace operations assessments, claiming the U.N. lack of foresight results in the draining of the Defense budget.

However, the cost of peace operations is not easily calculable in advance due to the unpredictable nature and tempo of recent actions. Unlike earlier long-term peace operations such as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, (UNIFIL), each of the new operations has its own budget. Nonetheless, the budget

figure for total annual peace operations will vary significantly from year to year because of the fluctuating number and pace of the operations. Budgets can easily double in size as political goals change overnight, as they did in the case of the former Yugoslavia.

Among other reform proposals put forth in support of improving U.N. peace operations is the creation at the U.N. of an Office of Inspector General to institute standards and procedures to improve the organization's functioning and accountability. President Clinton, in his 1993 address to the General Assembly advocated this proposal calling for a U.N. with a "reputation for toughness, for integrity, for effectiveness. Let us build new confidence among our people that the United Nations is changing with the needs of our times."[22]

In the meantime, the U.S. and the U.N. should begin immediately to try to make some reasonable adjustments in the favor of the U.S. for its donations over the years. If nothing else, it would be a sign of good faith toward a member that is crucial to, and supportive, of peace operations.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

With the emergence of the Clinton Administration's PDD 13 strategy imminent, the U.S. appears well on its way to formalizing its own position on U.N. peace operations. As suggested at the outset of this paper, the next logical step for U.S. leadership is to engage chiefs of state in an open dialogue about the goals and limits of U.N. peace operations.

Also, much remains to be done before the operational level of peace operations can take full root in support of the Security Council's goals. What seems obvious is the American awareness that improvements at the operational level of peace operations are sorely needed at U.N. Headquarters. Until such time when the U.S. is confident that operational conditions meet U.S. standards, American peace operations will be conducted for the most part under U.S. command.

What will soon be established is that U.S. forces will enter U.N. peace enforcement operations under the lead of the Department of Defense and the Commander and Chief only when U.S. interests are at stake and only when the presence of the U.S. is necessary for the success of the operation. Moreover, America will commit its forces only when U.S. forces will be under command of an American or under a command with an American in the number two position. Also, appropriate rules of engagement, the laws of conflict and U.S. doctrine must be honored.

That said, our commitment toward guiding the U.N. towards improving its own operational infrastructure seems to be gaining strength. And that is heartening.

The U.S. can play a crucial role in upgrading the peace operations apparatus at U.N. Headquarters in New York so that it can better carry out its complex tasks and more fully merit the confidence of U.S. officials, both civilian and military. As mentioned earlier, this involves improvements in intelligence capabilities, command and control, military operational expertise and rational financing at the U.N.

In closing, it is worth noting a key tenet of operational art and sound political military strategy and operation is to know thy enemy and know thyself. In a variant of that maxim the most important thing the U.S. can do in support of U.S. peace operations is to know our own national objectives and be realistic about what is attainable through the U.N. in today's new and vastly changed world. To ignore the U.N.'s potential would set back global progress. A far better course is to lead U.N. peace operations to a level of higher proficiency and professionalism.

NOTES

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1. Interviews with Ambassador Herbert Okun, Former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Peter Fromuth, U.S. Pol-Mil Advisor, U.S. Mission to the U.N., USAF Colonel Thomas Kearney, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, 12 Jan. 1994.

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